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Abstract
In this paper, we add a notion of plausible behavior to the branching-time logic
CTL so that we obtain a language to reason about what can (or must) plausibly
happen. Moreover, we propose a non-standard notion of beliefs, which is defined
in terms of epistemic relations and plausibility – and we investigate properties of
plausibility, knowledge and beliefs in this new framework. In particular, we show
that knowledge is still an S5 modality, and that beliefs satisfy axioms K45 in
general, and KD45 for the class of so called plausibly serial models. Finally,
we show that the relationship between knowledge and beliefs for plausibly serial
models is very natural and reflects the initial intuition well.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, temporal logic, plausibility, beliefs.
1 Introduction
Notions like time, knowledge, and beliefs seem to be very important for analyzing the
behavior of agents and multi-agent systems. Modal logics have proved successful in
providing a natural and intuitive theoretical framework, in which these (and other) no-
tions can be modeled and investigated. In this paper, we extend modal logics of time and
knowledge to consider a concept of plausible behavior. To this end, we add the concept
to the models and language of CTLK [11], which is a straightforward combination of
the branching-time temporal logic CTL [3, 2] and standard epistemic logic [6]. In our
approach, plausibility is seen as a temporal property of behaviors. That is, some behav-
iors of the system can be assumed plausible and others implausible, with the underlying
idea that the latter should be perhaps ignored in practical reasoning about possible fu-
ture courses of action. Moreover, behaviors can be formally understood as temporal
paths in the Kripke structure modeling a multi-agent system. In consequence, we ob-
tain a language to reason about what can (or must) plausibly happen. We propose a
non-standard notion of beliefs (inspired by [12]), defined in terms of epistemic rela-
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tions and plausibility. The main intuition is that beliefs are facts that an agent would
know if he assumed that only plausible things could happen.
We imply that humans use such a concept of plausibility and “practical beliefs” quite
often in their everyday reasoning. Restricting one’s reasoning to plausible possibilities
is essential to make the reasoning feasible, as the space of all possibilities is exceedingly
large in real life. We investigate some important properties of plausibility, knowledge,
and beliefs in this new framework. In particular, we show that knowledge is an S5
modality, and that beliefs satisfy axioms K45 in general, and KD45 for the class of
plausibly serial models. Finally, we show that the relationship between knowledge and
beliefs for plausibly serial models is natural and reflects the initial intuition well. We
also propose how plausibility assumptions can be specified in the object language via a
plausibility update operator, and we study properties of such updates.
2 Branching Time and Agents’ Knowledge
In this paper we build a framework for agents’ beliefs about how the world can (or
must) evolve. Thus, we need a notion of time and change, plus a notion of what the
agents are supposed to know in particular situations. The logic of CTLK [11] seems
to capture both dimensions in a natural way, and we will use it as the basis. CTLK is
a straightforward combination of the computation tree logic CTL [3, 2] and standard
epistemic logic [6]. CTL, on one hand, includes operators for temporal properties of
systems: i.e., path quantifiers E (“there is a path”) and A (“for every path”), together
with temporal operators: g(“in the next state”),  (“always from now on”) and U
(“until”).1 Every occurrence of a temporal operator is preceded by exactly one path
quantifier in CTL (this variant of the language is sometimes called “vanilla” CTL). The
broader language of CTL*, in which no such restriction is imposed, is not discussed
here in order to keep things simpler. Epistemic logic, on the other hand, uses operators
for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ is read as “agent a knows that ϕ”.2
Let Π be a set of atomic propositions with a typical element p, and Agt = {1, ..., k}
be a set of agents with a typical element a. The language of CTLK consists of formulae
ϕ, given as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Eγ | Aγ | Kaϕ
γ ::= gϕ |  ϕ | ϕU ϕ.
We will sometimes refer to formulae ϕ as (“vanilla”) state formulae and to formulae γ
as (“vanilla”) path formulae.
The semantics of CTLK is based on Kripke models M = 〈Q , R,∼1, ...,∼k, pi〉,
which include a nonempty set of states Q , a state transition relation R ⊆ Q × Q ,
epistemic indistinguishability relations∼a⊆ Q ×Q (one per agent), and a valuation of
1 An additional operator ♦ (“sometime”) can be defined as ♦ ϕ ≡ ⊤U ϕ.
2 We do not consider collective knowledge operators for the sake of simplicity.
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propositions pi : Π → P(Q). We assume that relation R is serial and that all ∼a are
equivalences. A path λ in M refers to a possible behavior (or computation) of system
M, and can be represented as an infinite sequence of states that follow relation R, that
is, a sequence q0q1q2... such that qiRqi+1 for every i = 0, 1, 2, .... We denote the ith
state in path λ by λ[i]. A q-path is a path that starts from q, i.e., λ[0] = q. The set of all
paths inM is denoted by ΛM and the set of all q-paths by ΛM(q) (if the model is clear
from the context, M will be omitted). Now, the semantics of CTLK can be defined as
below:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ pi(p);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |= ϕ and M, q |= ψ;
M, q |= E gϕ iff there is a q-path λ such that M, λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= E ϕ iff there is a q-path λ such that M, λ[i] |= ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= EϕU ψ iff there is a q-path λ and i ≥ 0 such that M, λ[i] |= ψ and
M, λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i;
M, q |= Kaϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
The semantics of the universal path quantifier A is defined analogously.
3 The Concept of Plausibility
In this section we discuss the central concept of this paper, i.e. the concept of plausibil-
ity. First, we present related work [5, 12, 10]. Next, we introduce our own approach.
3.1 Friedman and Halpern: Plausibility Spaces
The work of Friedman and Halpern [5] extends the concepts of knowledge and belief
with the notion of plausibility; i.e., some worlds can be more plausible for an agent than
others. To implement this idea, Kripke models are extended with function P which
assigns a plausibility space P (q, a) = (Ω(q,a),(q,a)) to every state q ∈ Q and agent
a ∈ Agt. The plausibility space is just a partially ordered subset of states; that is,
Ω(q, a) ⊆ Q , and (q,a)⊆ Q × Q is a reflexive and transitive relation. Let S, T ⊆
Ω(q,a) be finite subsets of states; now, T is defined to be plausible given S with respect
to P (q, a), denoted by S →P (q,a) T , iff all minimal points/states in S (with respect to
(q,a)) are also in T .
The language of knowledge and plausibility is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ |Kaϕ | ϕ→a ϕ,
where the semantics of all operators except→a is given as usual, and formulaeϕ→a ψ
have the meaning that ψ is true in the most plausible worlds in which ϕ holds. Formally,
the semantics for →a is given as:
M, q |= ϕ→a ψ iff SϕP (q,a) →P(q,a) S
ψ
P (q,a),
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q1
¬man, err
q2
man, err
q3
man,¬err
q4
¬man,¬err
Figure 1: Kripke model for a communication domain.
where Sϕ(q,a) = {q
′ ∈ Ω(q,a) | M, q
′ |= ϕ} are the states in Ω(q,a) that satisfy ϕ.
The idea of defining beliefs is given by the assumption that an agent believes in
something if he knows that it is true in the most plausible worlds of Ω(q,a); formally,
this can be stated as Baϕ ≡ Ka(⊤ →a ϕ).
Remark 1 Note that:
M, q |= Baϕ iff M, q |= Ka(⊤ →a ϕ)
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ⇒M, q′ |= ⊤ →a ϕ)
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ⇒ S⊤P (q′,a) →P (q′,a) SϕP (q′,a))
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ⇒ Ω(q′,a) →P (q′,a) SϕP (q′,a)).
The last line has the interpretation that all minimal points (with respect to (q′,a)) in
Ω(q′,a) must be in SϕP (q′,a) for all states q′ with q ∼a q′.
We will provide an example to clarify the idea behind this concept.
Example 1 Consider an agent a who can receive messages. Using a check digit, he is
able to recognize whether a received message contains an error (proposition error) or
it is error-free (¬error). An error can have two sources. First, the message could have
been manipulated (man) by someone, or second, the error might have occurred because
of an inaccurate transmission (¬man). Agent a cannot distinguish between these two
possible causes. Note that, even if the check digit is OK, a smart intruder could have
manipulated the message (whereas a faulty transmission is impossible in the case of an
error-free message).
Let M1 be the model shown in Figure 1. The epistemic relation is given by ∼a=
{(q1, q1), (q2, q2), (q3, q3),
(q4, q4), (q1, q2), (q2, q1), (q3, q4)(q4, q3)}. Suppose now that agent a receives a faulty
message. In this case the current state is q1 or q2 (as the agent cannot distinguish be-
tween these states). Obviously, the agent does not know if the message was manipulated
or not; i.e., q1 6|= Kaman and q2 6|= Kaman.
We now define the plausibility space P (q1, a) = (Ω(q1,a),(q1,a)) for state q1. Sup-
pose that messages are transmitted through a network with its own error correction
mechanism. Then, bad transmission can be considered less plausible than manipu-
lation by an intruder. That is, we have q2 ≺(q1,a) q1 for Ω(q1,a) = {q1, q2} (state
q2 is more plausible than state q1). On the other hand, if the message is all right, it
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is not plausible that someone did manipulate it because up-to-date encryption soft-
ware is used. In this case we define the following plausibility space for state q3:
P (q3, a) = (Ω(q3,a),(q3,a)) with Ω(q3,a) = {q3, q4} and q4 ≺(q3,a) q3. Finally,
we define the plausibility space for q2 by P (q2, a) = P (q1, a) and for state q4 by
P (q4, a) = P (q3, a).
With these plausibility orderings the agent believes that someone manipulated a
faulty message, but he but does not know it; i.e.,
|= (err → (Baman ∧ ¬Kaman)).
In the same way, he believes that an error-free message is not manipulated (but he but
does not know it):
|= (¬err → (Ba¬man ∧ ¬Ka¬man)).
This is because only the most plausible worlds are considered for beliefs.
Friedman and Halpern have shown that the KD45 axioms are valid for operatorBa
if plausibility spaces satisfy consistency (for all states q ∈ Q it holds that Ω(q,a) ⊆
{ q′ ∈ Q | q ∼a q
′ }) and normality (for all states q ∈ Q it holds that Ω(q,a) 6= ∅).3
They also extended the language with time, using the interpreted systems approach
developed in [7, 4].
3.2 Su et al.: KBC Logic
Su et al. [12] have developed a multi-modal, computationally grounded logic with
modalities K,B, and C (knowledge, belief, and certainty). The semantics is given
by an extension of interpreted systems. The computational model consists of (global)
states q = (qvis, qinv, qper ,Qpls) where the environment is divided into a visible (qvis)
and an invisible part (qinv), and qper captures the agent’s perception of the visible part
of the environment. External sources may provide the agent with information about the
invisible part of a state, which result in a set of states Qpls that are plausible for the
agent. Given a global state q, we additionally define V is(q) = qvis, Inv(q) = qinv ,
Per(q) = qper , and Pls(q) = Qpls.
A KBC system R is given by runs, where a run r : N → Q is a function from
time moments (modeled by N) to global states, and a point (r, i) is given by a time
point i ∈ N and a run r. An interpreted KBC system M = (R, pi) is given by a
system R and a valuation of propositions pi. KBC formulae are defined as ϕ ::=
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ |Kϕ | Bϕ | Cϕ. The epistemic relation∼vis is captured in the following
way: (r, i) ∼vis (r′, i′) iff V is(r(i)) = V is(r′(i′)). The semantic clauses are given
below:
3 Note that this “normality” is essentially seriality of states wrt plausibility spaces.
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M, r, i |= p iff p ∈ Π and p ∈ pi(V is(r(i)), Inv(r(i)))
M, r, i |= ¬ϕ iff M, r, i 6|= ϕ
M, r, i |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, r, i |= ϕ andM, r, i |= ψ
M, r, i |= Kϕ iff M, r′, i′ |= ϕ for all (r′, i′) with (r, i) ∼vis (r′, i′)
M, r, i |= Bϕ iff M, r′, i′ |= ϕ for all (r′, i′) with V is(r′(i′)) =
Per(r(i)) and Inv(r′(i′)) ∈ Pls(r(i))
M, r, i |= Cϕ iff M, r′, i′ |= ϕ for all (r′(i′)) with V is(r′(i′)) =
Per(r(i))
Thus, an agent believes that ϕ if, and only if, ϕ is true in all states which look like
what he sees now and seem plausible in the current state. Certainty is stronger: if an
agent is certain about ϕ, the formula must hold in all states with a visible part equal to
the current perception, regardless of whether the invisible part is plausible or not.
The logic does not include temporal formulae, although it can be easily extended
with temporal operators, as as time is already present in KBC models.
3.3 Moses and Shoham: Beliefs as Conditional Knowledge
In [5, 12], as well as in our approach (which will be introduced in Section 3.4), plau-
sibility is used as a primitive semantic concept that helps to define beliefs on top of
agents’ knowledge. A similar idea was introduced by Moses and Shoham in [10]. In
fact, their work preceded both [5] and [12] – and although Moses and Shoham do not
mention the term “plausibility” in their paper, it seems appropriate to summarize the
idea here.
In [10], beliefs are relativized with respect to a formula α (which can be seen as a
plausibility assumption expressed in the object language). This concept is expressed
via symbols Bαi ϕ; the index i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is used to distinguish between three different
implementations of beliefs. The first version is given by Bα1 ϕ ≡ K(α → ϕ).4 A
drawback of this version is that if α is false, then everything will be believed with
respect to α. The second version overcomes this problem: Bα2 ϕ ≡ K(α → ϕ) ∧
(K¬α → Kϕ); now ϕ is only believed if it is known that ϕ follows from assumption
α, and ϕmust be known if assumption α is known to be false. Finally,Bα3 ϕ ≡ K(α→
ϕ) ∧ ¬K¬α: if the assumption α is known to be false, nothing should be believed
with respect to α. The strength of these different notions is given as follows: Bα3 ϕ
implies Bα2 ϕ, and Bα2 ϕ implies Bα1 ϕ. In this approach belief is strongly connected to
knowledge in the sense that belief is knowledge with respect to a given assumption.
3.4 Our Approach: Plausibility as a Temporal Property
Plausibility can serve as a primitive concept that helps to define the semantics of beliefs,
in a similar way as indistinguishability of states (represented by relation ∼a) is the
4 Unlike in most approaches, K is interpreted over all worlds and not only over the indistinguishable
worlds.
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semantic concept that underlies knowledge. In this sense, our work follows [5, 12]:
essentially, beliefs are what an agent would know if he took only plausible options into
account.
The work in [5, 12], however, attributes plausibility to states (possible worlds).
[5] assumes orderings on worlds, and [12] provides agents with additional assumptions
about the “invisible part” of each state. Thus, plausibility in [5, 12] is a static property
of states. In our approach, plausibility is seen as a temporal property. That is, we do
not consider states to be more plausible than others but rather define some behaviors
to be plausible (and others implausible). Moreover, as we propose in Section 4, behav-
iors can be formally understood as temporal paths in the Kripke structure modeling a
multi-agent system.
An actual notion of plausibility (that is, a particular set of plausible paths) can emerge
in many different ways. It may result from observations and learning from the environ-
ment; an agent can learn from his observations and see specific patterns of events as
plausible (“a lot of people wear black shoes if they wear a suit”). Knowledge exchange
is another possibility (e.g., an agent a can tell agent b that “player c always bluffs
when he is smiling”). Last but not least, folk knowledge is an important source of
plausibility-related classifications of behavior (“players normally want to win a game”,
“people want to live”).
We (i.e., the authors) point out that we (i.e., humans) use this (or a similar) concept
of plausibility quite often in our everyday reasoning. Of course, we know that people
do commit suicides, that players may sometimes be indifferent or even want to lose,
and that there are some guys who really wear white sport shoes to a suit – but we
usually disregard these possibilities when analyzing potential outcomes of our actions.
Restricting the reasoning to plausible possibilities is essential to make the reasoning
feasible, as the space of all possibilities (we call them “physical” possibilities in the
rest of the paper) is exceedingly large in real life. A more extensive analysis must
be conducted only in emergency, e.g. when our plausibility assumptions do not seem
accurate any more (“my girlfriend looks depressed, I’d better take more care of her or
she might do something bad to her”), or when the cost of inaccurate assumptions can be
too high (like in the case of high-budget business decisions). And even in these cases,
we do not get rid of plausibility assumptions completely – we only revise them to make
them more cautious.5
To formalize this idea, we extend models of CTLK with sets of plausible paths and
add plausibility operators Pl a, physical paths operator Ph , and belief operatorsBa to
the language of CTLK. Now, it is possible to make statements that refer to plausible
paths only, as well as statements that regard all paths that may occur in the system.
5 That is, when planning to open an industrial plant in the UK, we will probably consider the possibility
of our main contractor taking his life, but we will still not take into account the possibilities of: an invasion
of UFO, England being destroyed by a meteorite, Fidel Castro becoming the British Prime Minister etc. Note
that this is fundamentally different from using a probabilistic model in which all these unlikely scenarios are
assigned very low probabilities: in that case, they also have a very small influence on our final decision, but
we must process the whole space of physical possibilities to evaluate the options.
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For instance, we may claim it is plausible to assume that a shop is closed after the
opening hours, though the manager may be physically able to open it at any time:
Pl aA (late → ¬open) ∧Ph E♦ (late ∧ open).
Finally, we want to point out that we see plausibility as a subjective property; i.e.
every agent has his own notion of plausibility encoded in a model.
4 Extending Time and Knowledge with Plausibility and
Beliefs
In this section, we extend the logic of CTLK with the notion of plausibility. We will call
the resulting logic CTLKP. To implement our concept, we add plausible path operators
Pl a and physical path operator Ph to CTLK. Formula Pl aϕ has the intended mean-
ing: according to agent a, it is plausible that ϕ holds; formula Phϕ reads as: ϕ holds
in all “physically” possible scenarios (i.e., even in implausible ones). The plausible
path operator restricts statements only to these paths which are defined to be “sensi-
ble”, whereas the physical path operator generates statements about all paths that may
theoretically occur. Furthermore, we define beliefs on top of plausibility and knowl-
edge, as the facts that an agent would know if he assumed that only plausible things
could happen.
4.1 CTLK with Plausibility
Formally, the language of CTLKP is defined as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Eγ | Aγ | Pl aϕ | Phϕ | Kaϕ | Baϕ
γ ::= gϕ |  ϕ | ϕU ϕ.
For example, we can now express the property that it is plausible to expect that an
agent will not commit suicide; on the other hand, an agent is (always) physically able
to commit that, and it is also plausible to expect that he has this physical ability:
Pl aA ¬suicide ∧ A PhE♦ suicide ∧Pl aA PhE♦ suicide.
The semantics of CTLKP extends that of CTLK as follows. First, we augment
the models with sets of plausible paths. A model with plausibility is given as M =
〈Q , R,∼1, ...,∼k,Υ1, ...,Υk, pi〉, where 〈Q , R,∼1, ...,∼k, pi〉 is a CTLK model, and
Υa ⊆ ΛM is the set of paths in M that are plausible according to agent a. If we want
to make it clear that Υa is taken from model M, we will write ΥMa . It seems worth
emphasizing that this notion of plausibility is subjective and global. It is subjective
because Υa represents agent a’s subjective view on what is plausible – and indeed, dif-
ferent agents may have different ideas on plausibility (i.e., Υa may differ from Υb). It
is global because Υa represents agent a’s idea of the plausible behavior of the whole
system (including the behavior of other agents).
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Second, we use a non-standard satisfaction relation |=P , which we call plausible
satisfaction. Let M be a CTLKP model and P ⊆ ΛM be an arbitrary subset of paths
in M (not necessarily ΥM). |=P restricts the evaluation of temporal formulae to the
paths given in P only. The “absolute” satisfaction relation |= is defined as |=ΛM .
Let ∂(P ) be the set of all states from which at least one path in P starts, i.e.
∂(P ) = {q ∈ Q | ∃λ ∈ P λ[0] = q)}. Now, the semantics of CTLKP can be given
via the following clauses:
M, q |=P p iff q ∈ pi(p);
M, q |=P ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|=P ϕ;
M, q |=P ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |=P ϕ andM, q |=P ψ;
M, q |=P E gϕ iff there is a q-path λ ∈ P such that M, λ[1] |=P ϕ;
M, q |=P E ϕ iff there is a q-path λ ∈ P such that M, λ[i] |=P ϕ for every
i ≥ 0;
M, q |=P EϕU ψ iff there is a q-path λ ∈ P and i ≥ 0 such thatM, λ[i] |=P ψ,
andM, λ[j] |=P ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i;
M, q |=P Pl aϕ iff M, q |=Υa ϕ;
M, q |=P Phϕ iff M, q |= ϕ;
M, q |=P Kaϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼a q′;
M, q |=P Baϕ iff for all q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) with q ∼ q′, we have thatM, q′ |=Υa ϕ.
Again, the semantics of the universal path quantifier A is defined analogously. One
of the main reasons for using the concept of plausibility is that we want to define agents’
beliefs out of more primitive concepts – in our case, these are plausibility and indistin-
guishability – in a way analogous to [12]. If an agent knows that ϕ, he must be “sure”
about it. However, beliefs of an agent are not necessarily about reliable facts, and they
can obviously be wrong. In spite of that, they should make sense to the agent; if he
believes that ϕ, then the formula should at least hold in all futures that he envisages as
plausible. Thus, beliefs of an agent may be seen as things known to him if he disregards
all non-plausible possibilities.
We say that ϕ is M-true (M |= ϕ) if M, q |= ϕ for all q ∈ QM. ϕ is valid
(|= ϕ) if M |= ϕ for all models M. ϕ is M-strongly true (M|≡ϕ) if M, q |=P
ϕ for all q ∈ QM and all P ⊆ ΛM. ϕ is strongly valid ( |≡ϕ) if M|≡ϕ for all
models M. Ultimately, we are going to be interested in normal (not strong) validity,
as parameterizing the satisfaction relation with a set P is just a technical device for
propagating sets of plausible paths Υa into the semantics of nested formulae.
Proposition 2 Strong truth and strong validity imply truth and validity, respectively.
The reverse does not hold in general.
Proof. Strong truth and validity holds especially for P = Λ. For the reverse implica-
tion, see e.g. the proof of Axiom T in Theorem 6. 
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q1 satc4
q2
coopc2,c3 ,bankc2,c3
q3
coopc2,c3 ,satc2
satc3 ,capc2,c3
bankc2,c3
q4
imp
q5
imp,control
q6
imp,bankc4
q7 imp,bankc4 ,capc4 ,satc4
q8 capc4 ,bankc4 ,satc4
q9 bankc4
Figure 2: CTLKP model, where all paths which do not contain a dotted line represent
plausible paths of c1 and the grey areas model incomplete information of c1.
Corollary 3 If ϕ is not valid, then ϕ is not strongly valid, and if ϕ is not M-true, then
ϕ is not M-strongly true.
Example 2 Figure 2 shows CTLKP model M2 which represents the following sce-
nario. Company c1 is insolvent and firms c2, c3, and c4 are interested in taking over c1.
To this end, c2 and c3 may cooperate; on the other hand, c4 can impend the other com-
panies to prevent their cooperation. All firms need additional money for the takeover.
Company c1 has incomplete information about the world, modeled by relation∼c1 . The
set of plausible paths Υc1 , according to company c1, is given by all (infinite) paths that
do not contain a dotted edge, e.g. q1q2q2 . . . 6 The following propositions are used:
sati: company i is satisfied
banki,j: companies i, j get money from the bank (j is optional)
coopi,j: cooperation of i and j.
capi,j: companies i, j capture (take over) company c1 (j is optional)
imp: company c4 impends the cooperation of c2 and c3 (e.g. by dumping prices against
c2 and c3)
control: companies c2 and c3 consult a control instance to check the conduct of c4 (e.g.
check on violations of market rules)
In q1, company c4 is satisfied because it remains the biggest company if nothing
happens. In q2, c2 and c3 have cooperated and borrowed money from the bank. Because
6 Note that in general it is not possible to use this (finite) representation to capture an (infinite) set of
plausible paths because plausibility of a transition often depends on previous transitions.
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the manager of company c4 does not like the newly created cooperation, he may decide
to impend c2 or c3 so that they will break up their joining (this leads to state q4; note
that this course of events is implausible according to c1). The threatened company can
decide to consult a control instance to check for violation of market rules, which is
modeled by state q5. Then, the control instance has to deliberate about the case because
it is not so obvious that a violation of the law occurred, but even c4 becomes unsure
of its possibly dubious acting, so all parties decide to “forget about everything” which
results in a transition to q1 (and, again, only company c4 is satisfied).
Note that, for example, formula
Pl c1E♦ A (satc1 ∨ satc4)
is true in M2 but
Ph E♦ A (satc1 ∨ satc4).
is not. We will carefully show these properties for any q ∈ Q :
M, q |=Pl c1E♦ A (satc1 ∨ satc4)
iff there is λ ∈ Υc1(q) and i ∈ N0
such that M, λ[i] |=Υc1 A (satc1 ∨ satc4)
iff there is λ ∈ Υc1(q) such that for all λ
′ ∈ Υc1(λ[i]), i ∈ N0,
and for all j ∈ N0 we have satc4 ∈ pi(λ′(j)) or satc1 ∈ pi(λ′(j)).
On the other hand, A (satc1 ∨ satc4) is plausibly satisfied in states q3, q7, and q8.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that from all states q ∈ Q\{q7} there is a plausible path
from q to q3 or q8, and in q7 the only plausible q7-path is q7q7q7 . . . . In the case of
all possible scenarios, states in which c2 or c4 are satisfied can always be left, and
therefore, PhE♦ A (satc1 ∨ satc4) is not valid.
Another interesting property is that company c4 is always physically able to impend
the cooperation of c2 and c3, but it is not plausible that c4 would ever impend the
cooperation according to c1’s view of plausibility:
|= A Ph (coopc2,c3 → E♦ imp) ∧Pl c1(¬imp → A ¬impend).
Furthermore, c1 – having been captured by c4 – believes that c4 will always be satisfied,
but does not know it for sure: |= (capc4 → Bc1A satc4 ∧ ¬Kc1A satc4).
4.2 Defining Plausible Paths with Formulae
So far, we have assumed that sets of plausible paths are somehow given in a model. In
this section we present a dynamic approach where an actual notion of plausibility can
be specified in the object language. Note that we want to specify (usually infinite) sets
of infinite paths, and we need a finite representation of these structures. One logical so-
lution is given by using path formulae γ. These formulae describe properties of paths;
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therefore, a specific formula can be used to characterize a set of paths. For instance,
think about a country in Africa where it should never snow; then plausible paths might
be defined as ones in which it never snows, i.e., all paths that satisfy  ¬snows. For-
mally, we define |γ|M to be the set of paths that satisfy path formula γ in model M
(when the model is clear from the context, the subscript will be omitted):
| gϕ|M = {λ | M, λ[1] |= ϕ}
| ϕ|M = {λ | ∀i (M, λ[i] |= ϕ)}
|ϕ1U ϕ2|M = {λ | ∃i
(
M, λ[i] |= ϕ2 ∧ ∀j(0 ≤ j < i⇒M, λ[j] |= ϕ1)
)
}.
Moreover, we define the plausible paths model update as follows. Let
M = 〈Q , R,∼1, ...,∼k,Υ1, ...,Υk, pi〉 be a CTLKP model, and let P ⊆ ΛM be a
set of paths. Then Ma,P = 〈Q , R,∼1, ...,∼k,Υ1, ...,Υa−1, P,Υa+1, ...,Υk, pi〉 de-
notes model M with a’s set of plausible paths reset to P . Note that the set of all paths
remains the same in both models because the transition relation does not change, i.e.,
ΛM = ΛMa,P .
Now we can extend the language of CTLKP with formulae (set-pla γ)ϕ with the
intuitive reading: “suppose that γ exactly characterizes the set of plausible paths, then
ϕ holds”, and formal semantics given below:
M, q |=P (set-pla γ)ϕ iff Ma,|γ|, q |=P ϕ.
We observe that this update scheme is similar to the one proposed in [8].
Remark 4 Note that the set of paths with which the satisfaction relation is anno-
tated does not change after a plausible path update. Consider a CTLKP model M =
〈Q , R,∼1, . . . ,∼k,Υ1, . . . ,Υk, pi〉 and statement
M, q |=P (set-pla γ)ϕ.
The semantic rules transform the formula into the equivalent notation
Ma,|γ|, q |=P ϕ.
But the set of paths P , with which the satisfaction relation is indexed, is still the same
as before. If we want set ΥMa,|γ|a to be referred to, plausible operator Pl a must occur
within formula ϕ.
Example 3 Consider the scenario from Example 2. Suppose that it becomes implausi-
ble (according to c1) that companies c2 and c3 will ever cooperate. Moreover, it is not
likely that c4 may impend another company (there is no reason for c4 for such an action
any more). Thus, the plausible paths (from c1’s perspective) can be now described by
the path formula γ1 ≡  (¬coopc2,c3 ∧¬imp). Under this assumption: if c4 is satisfied
now, then it will be always either satisfied or have a way of becoming satisfied in the
next moment. That is, formula (set-pla γ1)Pl c1(satc4 → A (satc4 ∨ E gsatc4)) is
true in the model from Fig. 2.
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4.3 Plausible Paths: Discussion
So far, we did not assume anything about plausibility sets. Does every set of plausible
paths make equal sense? Probably not. Here, we are going to suggest that there should
be at least one plausible path starting in each state of the system. In fact, it is hard to
imagine a situation with no outgoing plausible paths because it would mean that, if such
a situation occurs, the agent will see no plausible future at all. Even when we consider
a state which does not seem to plausibly happen from the perspective of our current
state (that is, a state q′ which is not reachable via a plausible path from the current
state q): still, there should be a plausible path going out of q′. Though it seems now
incredible that q′ ever occurs, if this does happen, it should be accepted as a fact, and
some outgoing paths should be seen as more plausible than the others. We formalize
this restriction through the notion of plausible seriality of models.
A CTLKP model is plausibly serial (or p-serial) if every state of the system has
an outgoing plausible path, i.e. ∂(Υa) = Q . As we will see in Section 5, a weaker
requirement is sometimes sufficient. We call a model weakly p-serial if every state has
at least one indistinguishable counterpart from which a plausible path starts, i.e. for
each q ∈ Q there is a q′ ∈ Q such that q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa). Obviously, p-seriality
implies weak p-seriality.
5 Investigating Plausibility, Knowledge, and Beliefs in
CTLKP
In this section we study some relevant properties of plausibility, knowledge, and beliefs;
in particular, axioms K,D, T, 4, 5 are examined.
5.1 Axiomatic Properties of Knowledge and Beliefs
We start with a slightly non-standard characterization of equivalence relations.
Lemma 5 Relation ∼ is an equivalence relation (i.e., ∼ is transitive, reflexive, and
symmetric) if and only if it is reflexive, symmetric, and euclidean. Moreover, an equiv-
alence relation is serial.
Proof. We show that equivalence relation ∼ is also euclidean. Let x ∼ y and x ∼ z.
Symmetry (x ∼ y ⇒ y ∼ x) and transitivity (y ∼ x ∧ x ∼ z ⇒ y ∼ z) implies that
y ∼ z.
Now, we assume that ∼ is reflexive, symmetric, and euclidean. Let x ∼ y and
y ∼ z. This implies transitivity (i.e., x ∼ z), because we have y ∼ x (symmetry) and
y ∼ x ∧ y ∧ z ⇒ x ∼ z (euclidity).
Seriality follows from reflexivity. 
Now, the following result can be proved.
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q
Figure 3: Model in which axiom T is not strongly valid.
Theorem 6 Axioms K,D, 4, and 5 for knowledge are strongly valid, and axiom T is
valid. That is, modalities Ka form system S5 (in the sense of normal validity; and
KD45 in the sense of strong validity).
Proof. Let M be a CTLKP model, P ⊆ ΛM, and q ∈ QM.
Axiom K: |≡Kaϕ ∧Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kaψ. We have to show that M |=P Kaϕ ∧
Ka(ϕ → ψ) implies M |=P Kaψ. Assume M, q |=P Kaϕ ∧ Ka(ϕ → ψ);
it holds if and only if ∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′ ⇒ (q′ |= ϕ and q′ |= ϕ → ψ)
)
if
∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ |= ψ
)
iff q |=P Kaψ.
Axiom D: |≡Kaϕ→ ¬Ka¬ϕ. SupposeM, q |=P Kaϕ. We have to show that ∃q′ ∈
QM(q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ |= ϕ); this is true for q′ = q, due to the assumption and
reflexivity of ∼a.
Axiom 4: |≡Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ. SupposeM, q |=P Kaϕ. We show that ∀q′ ∈ QM
(
q ∼a
q′ ⇒ ∀q′′ ∈ QM(q′ ∼a q′′ ⇒ q′′ |= ϕ)
)
. Because of transitivity, we have
q ∼a q′′, and because of the assumption, we obtain q′′ |= ϕ.
Axiom 5: |≡¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ. Suppose M, q |= ¬Kaϕ; that is, ∃q′ ∈ QM(q ∼a
q′ ∧ q′ 6|= ϕ); let q′ = q∗ be such a state. Then, we have ∀q′ ∈ QM
(
q ∼a q′ ⇒
∃q′′ ∈ QM(q′ ∼a q′′ ∧ q′′ 6|= ϕ)
)
because of euclidity (q ∼a q∗ and q ∼ q′
implies q′ ∼ q∗).
Axiom T: |= Kaϕ→ ϕ. SupposeM, q |= Kaϕ; i.e., ∀q′ ∈ QM(q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ |= ϕ).
Because of reflexivity, we have q ∼a q, and thus, M, q |= ϕ.
A counterexample against strong validity of T is given in Example 4.

Example 4 Consider CTLKP modelM3 shown in Figure 3, with the epistemic relation
∼a= {(q1, q1), (q2, q2)}, and any set of plausible paths. Axiom T is not strongly valid
if there is a q ∈ QM and a set of paths P ⊆ Λ so that q 6|=P Kaϕ → ϕ. That is, if
q |=P Kaϕ and q |=P ¬ϕ which is equivalent to ∀q′ ∈ QM(q ∼a q′ ⇒ q′ |= ϕ) and
q |=P ¬ϕ. From the reflexivity of ∼a it follows that q |= ϕ and q |=P ¬ϕ must be
satisfiable. Let q = q1, P = {(q1q2q2 . . . ), (q2q2 . . . )}, and ϕ ≡ E p. Then we have
q1 |= ϕ and q1 |=P ¬ϕ,
so T is not strongly valid in M3.
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A similar study for beliefs brings the following results.
Proposition 7 Axioms K , 4, and 5 for beliefs are strongly valid. That is, we have:
|≡ (Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ))→ Baψ, |≡ (Baϕ→ BaBaϕ), and |≡ (¬Baϕ→ Ba¬Baϕ).
Proof. Let M be a CTLKP model, P ⊆ Λ, and q, q′, q′′ ∈ Q .
Axiom K: q |=P Baϕ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ) iff ∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′∧q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)⇒ q
′ |=Υa ϕ∧
q′ |=Υa (ϕ→ ψ)
)
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′∧q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)⇒ q
′ |=Υa ϕ∧q
′ |=Υa ψ
)
,
so q |=P Baψ.
Axiom 4: Assume that q |=P Baϕ; i.e., ∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′∧q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)⇒ q
′ |=Υa ϕ
)
.
We have to show that also q |=P BaBaϕ which is the case if and only if ∀q ∈
Q
(
q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)⇒ ∀q
′′ ∈ Q
(
q′ ∼a q′′ ∧ q′′ ∈ ∂(Υa)⇒ q
′′ |=Υa ϕ
))
.
This condition holds because if q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) and q′ ∼a q′′ and
q′′ ∈ ∂(Υa) then also q ∼a q′′ (transitivity of∼a) and certainly still q′′ ∈ ∂(Υa);
therefore, q′′ |=Υa ϕ holds by the assumption.
Axiom 5: The proof is similar to the previous one. Assume that q |=P ¬Baϕ. This is
equivalent to ∃q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) ∧ q
′ 6|=Υa ϕ
)
; let q′ = q∗ be such
a state (there is such a state because we assumed that ¬Baϕ holds). We have
to show that also q |=P Ba¬Baϕ; i.e., the condition ∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈
∂(Υa)⇒ ∃q
′′ ∈ Q
(
q′ ∼a q′′ ∧ q′′ ∈ ∂(Υa) ∧ q
′′ 6|=Υa ϕ
))
. We show that q∗ is
also such a required state for all q′. If q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) then also q′ ∼a q∗
(because ∼a is euclidean and we have q ∼a q∗ and q ∼a q′), and moreover,
q∗ ∈ ∂(Υa). By the assumption, it follows that q∗ 6|=Υa ϕ for q
′′ = q∗.

The next proposition concerns the “consistency” axiom D: Baϕ → ¬Ba¬ϕ. It
is easy to see that the axiom is not valid in general: as we have no restrictions on
plausibility sets Υa, it may be as well that Υa = ∅. In that case we have Baϕ ∧Ba¬ϕ
for all formulae ϕ, because the set of states to be considered becomes empty. However,
it turns out that D is valid for a very natural class of models.
Proposition 8 AxiomD for beliefs is not valid in the class of all CTLKP models. How-
ever, it is strongly valid in the class of weak p-serial models (and therefore also in the
class of p-serial models).
Proof. Let M be a CTLKP model, P ⊆ Λ, and q, q′ ∈ Q . First, let M be weakly
p-serial. Axiom D is strongly valid if, for all states in which Baϕ is true, ¬Ba¬ϕ is
also true; hence, we assume that
q |=P Baϕ; (∗)
15 Technical Report IfI-06-05
Investigating Plausibility, Knowledge, and Beliefs in CTLKP
i.e., for all q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) it holds that q′ |=Υa ϕ. Now, the
conclusion must be shown:
q |=P ¬Ba¬ϕ iff not for all q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′
and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) we have q′ |=Υa ¬ϕ
iff there is a q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′
and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) and q′ |=Υa ϕ.
(∗∗)
Because the model is weakly p-serial, there is a state q′ with q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa);
hence, because of (∗), it holds that q′ |=Υa ϕ and therefore (∗∗).
Next, we show that the axiom is not valid in the class of all CTLKP models. Let Υa
be empty. With this definition (∗) is true but (∗∗) is false. 
Moreover, as one may expect, beliefs do not have to be always true.
Proposition 9 Axiom T for beliefs is not valid; i.e., 6|= (Baϕ → ϕ). The axiom is not
even valid in the class of p-serial models.
Proof. For a counterexample consider Figure 3 once more. Let Υa be given as
{(q1q1 . . . )}, and a’s epistemic relation as ∼a= {(q1, q1), (q2, q2)}. Then we have
q1 |= BaA p but not q1 |= A p which contradicts the validity of axiom T . 
All the above results are summarized in the next theorem.
Theorem 10 Belief modalities Ba form system K45 in the class of all models, and
KD45 in the class of weakly plausibly serial models (in the sense of both normal and
strong validity). Axiom T is not even valid for p-serial models.
An additional (but nevertheless interesting) property of Ba is that an agent believes
that his beliefs are true:
Proposition 11 Formula Ba(Baϕ→ ϕ) is strongly valid.
Proof. The formula holds iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) ⇒
(
∃q′′ ∈ Q(q′ ∼a
q′′ ∧ q′′ ∈ ∂(Υa)∧ q
′′ 6|=Υa ϕ) ∨ q
′ |=Υa ϕ
))
holds. This is certainly the case because
with q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) we also have q′ ∼a q′, and therefore, q′ 6|=Υa ϕ or
q′ |=Υa ϕ. 
5.2 Interaction between Plausibility, Knowledge, and Beliefs
First, we investigate the relationship between knowledge and plausibility/physicality
operators. Then, we look at the interaction between knowledge and beliefs, examining
some axioms presented in [9].
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Proposition 12 Let ϕ be a CTLKP formula, and M be a CTLKP model. We have the
following strong validities:
(i) |≡Pl aKaϕ↔ Kaϕ
(ii) |≡PhKaϕ↔ KaPhϕ↔ Kaϕ
Proof. Let P ⊆ ΛM.
(i) It follows from the fact that the definition of Ka “overwrites” the set of paths P
with which the satisfaction relation is annotated.
(ii) We have that:
M, q |=P PhKaϕ iff M, q |= Kaϕ
iff for all M, q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′ it holds that M, q′ |= ϕ
iff M, q |=P Kaϕ
iff for all M, q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′ it holds that M, q′ |=P Phϕ
iff |=P KaPhϕ.

We now want to examine the relationship between knowledge and beliefs. For in-
stance, if agent a believes in something, he knows that he believes it. Or, if he knows
a fact, he also believes that he knows it. On the other hand, for instance, an agent does
not necessarily believe in all the things he knows.
Proposition 13 The following formulae are strongly valid:
(i) Baϕ→ KaBaϕ (ii) KaBaϕ→ Baϕ (iii) Kaϕ→ BaKaϕ
The following formulae are not valid:
(iv) Baϕ→ BaKaϕ (v) Kaϕ→ Baϕ
Proof. Let M = (Q , R,∼1, . . . ,∼k,Υ1, . . .Υk, pi), and q, q′, q′′ ∈ Q .
(a) (i) Assume that Baϕ holds; we show that KaBaϕ. The latter formula does not
hold iff ∃q′
(
q ∼a q′ ∧ ∃q′′(q′ ∼a q′′ ∧ q′′ ∈ ∂(Υa) ∧ q
′′ 6|=Υa ϕ)
)
. But this
condition is never fulfilled because if q ∼a q′ and q′ ∼a q′′ and q′′ ∈ ∂(Υ)
then also q ∼a q′′ and by assumption it follows q′′ |=Υa ϕ.
(ii) Assume thatKaBaϕ holds; i.e., formula ∀q′
(
q ∼a q′ ⇒ ∀q′′(q′ ∼a q′′∧q′′ ∈
∂(Υa) ⇒ q
′′ |=Υa ϕ)
)
. Hence, Baϕ is true because otherwise there must
exist a q∗ with (q ∼a q∗ ∧ q∗ ∈ ∂(Υa) ∧ q∗ 6|=Υa ϕ). But this would
yield a contradiction, since ∼a is reflexive (so the assumption would apply to
q′′ = q∗ and we would obtain q′ |=Υa ϕ).
(iii) The same reason as for (i); if q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) and q′ ∼a q′′ then also
q ∼a q′′.
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(b) (i) Assume that Baϕ holds. Then, ∀q′
(
q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) ⇒ ∀q
′′(q′ ∼a
q′′ ⇒ q′′ |= ϕ)
)
does not hold for all states because q′′ may not be a beginning
of a plausible path so that the assumption does not secure q′′ |=Υa ϕ and
especially not q′′ |= ϕ.
(ii) See the counterexample in Example 5.

Example 5 Formula Kaϕ → Baϕ has the meaning that everything that is known
should also be believed. In our approach this is not the case. The axiom would hold
if and only if the following statement would hold: ∀q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′ it holds that
q′ |= ϕ implies that ∀q′ ∈ Q with q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) we have q′ |=Υa ϕ. Because
generally Υa ⊂ Λ, there could be a path in Λ\Υa so that ϕ is fulfilled on that path. We
will now specify ϕ and provide an example for our assumption.
Consider modelM3 from Figure 3, and formula ϕ ≡ E p again. The agent knows
that ϕ is true in q1:
M3, q1 |= Kaϕ
because only q1 ∼a q1, andM3, q1 |=Λ E p (note that p is true along path q1q1q1q1 . . . ).
Furthermore, q1 is in ∂(Υa) = {q1, q2} but M3, q1 6|=Υa E p since p does not hold
in q2, and the only plausible q1-path is q1q2q2 . . . . Thus,
M3, q1 6|=P Baϕ
which shows that Kaϕ 6→ Baϕ.
The last invalidity is especially important: it is not the case that knowing some-
thing implies believing in it. For example, we may know that an invasion from another
galaxy is in principle possible (KaE♦ invasion), but if we do not take this possibility as
plausible (¬Pl aE♦ invasion), then we reject the corresponding belief in consequence
(¬BaE♦ invasion). This emphasizes that we study a specific concept of beliefs here.
Note that this specific is not due to the notion of plausibility itself; the reason lies rather
in the fact that we investigate knowledge and beliefs in a temporal framework. This
observation is formalized in the next proposition. After that, we show how the rela-
tionship between knowledge and beliefs can be characterized for the class of p-serial
models.
Proposition 14 Let ϕ be a CTLKP formula that does not include any temporal opera-
tors. Then Kaϕ → Baϕ is strongly valid, and in the class of p-serial models we have
even that |≡Kaϕ↔ Baϕ.
Proof. Assume that M, q |= Kaϕ holds; i.e., for all q′ with q ∼a q′ we have that
M, q′ |= ϕ. We show that Baϕ also holds. First, let q′ ∈ ∂(Υa); then, q′ |=Υa ϕ
holds because no temporal operator occurs in ϕ (which makes the set of plausible paths
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irrelevant). On the other hand, if there is no state q′ with q ∼a q′ and q′ ∈ ∂(Υa) then
Baϕ is trivially true.
In the class of p-serial models, we have ∂(Υa) = Q , and therefore, the condition
q ∈ ∂(Υa) is always true for all q ∈ Q . Furthermore, we have q |=Υa ϕ if and only
if q |= ϕ because ϕ does not contain any temporal operator (and therefore no path
quantifier). 
Theorem 15 The following formulae are strongly valid in the class of plausibly serial
CTLKP models:
(i) KaPl aϕ↔ Baϕ (ii) Kaϕ↔ BaPhϕ
Proof.
(i)
M, q |=P Baϕ iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊤
⇒M, q′ |=Υa ϕ)
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q
(
q ∼a q
′ ⇒M, q′ |=Λ Pl aϕ
)
iff M, q |=P KPl aϕ.
(ii)
M, q |=P Kaϕ iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ⇒M, q′ |= ϕ)
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ⇒M, q′ |=Υa Phϕ)
iff ∀q′ ∈ Q(q ∼a q′ ∧ q′ ∈ ∂(Υa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊤
⇒M, q′ |=Υa Phϕ)
iff M, q |=P BaPhϕ

Note that this characterization has a strong commonsense reading: believing is know-
ing that ϕ plausibly holds, and knowing is believing that it holds physically.
Finally, we observe an important feature of our plausibility operators. If a sequence
of plausibility operators occurs in a formula, then only then only the last of them mat-
ters.
Proposition 16 |≡Pl iPl jϕ↔ Pl jϕ for any agents i, j and formula ϕ.
Proof. Let M be a CTLKP model, P ⊆ ΛM and M, q ∈ QM. Then, we have:
M, q |=P Pl iPl jϕ iff M, q |=Υ
i
Pl jϕ iff M, q |=Υ
j
ϕ iff M, q |=P Pl jϕ. 
Note also that the above feature does not extend to beliefs, i.e., 6|= BiBjϕ↔ Bjϕ.
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Figure 4: ModelM4 with 3 states, and propositions p, q, and r
5.3 Properties of the Update
The plausibility update influences only formulae in which plausibility plays a role, i.e.
ones in which belief or plausibility modalities occur.
Proposition 17 Let ϕ be a CTLKP formula that does not include operators Pl a and
Ba, and γ be a CTLKP path formula. Then, we have |≡ϕ↔ (set-pla γ)ϕ.
Proof. Let M be a CTLKP model, q ∈ QM and P ⊆ ΛM. Then, we have: M, q |=P
(set-pla γ)ϕ iffMa,|γ|, q |=P ϕ. Because ϕ does not contain theBa and Pl a operator,
the sets of plausible paths in the models are irrelevant; thus, we have Ma,|γ|, q |=P ϕ
iff M, q |=P ϕ. 
What can be said about the result of an update? At first sight, formula (set-pla γ)Pl aAγ
seems a natural characterization; unfortunately, it is not valid. In short, this is because,
by leaving the other paths out of the scope, we may change properties of the paths that
used to satisfy γ – in particular, they may cease to satisfy γ after that. The next
example provides a more concrete argument.
Example 6 Consider model M4 from Figure 4. Let γ ≡  E gq. The set of paths
described by γ is {λ ∈ Λ | ∀i ∈ N0
(
M, λ[i] |= E gq
)
} = {(q1q1q1 . . . )}. This set
will become the set of plausible paths ΥM′a in model M′ = M
a,|γ|
4 . Now, we can
show that M4, q1 6|= (set-pla γ)Pl aAγ:
M4, q1 |= (set-pla γ)Pl aAγ
iff M′, q1 |=ΥM′a Aγ (whereM′ =M
a,{(q1q1q1... )}
4 )
iff ∀λ ∈ ΥM′a (q1) it holds that M′, λ[i] |=ΥM′a E
gq for all i ∈ N0
iff M′, q1 |=ΥM′a E
gq
iff ∃λ ∈ ΥM′a (q1) with M′, λ[1] |=ΥM′a q
iff M′, q1 |=ΥM′a q
Clearly, q does not hold in q1 which proves that the formula is not valid.
We propose two alternative ways out: the first one restricts the language of the update
similarly to [13]; the other refers to physical possibilities, in a way analogous to [8].
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Proposition 18 The CTLKP formula (set-pla γ)Pl aAγ is not valid. However, we have
the following strong validities:
(i) |≡ (set-pla γu)Pl aAγu, where γu is a universal path formula, defined as:
γu ::= gϕu |  ϕu | ϕuU ϕu,
ϕu ::= p | ¬p | ϕu ∧ ϕu | ϕu ∨ ϕu | Aγu | Kaϕu.
(ii) If ϕ is an arbitrary CTL formula, then:
|≡ (set-pla gϕ)Pl aA g(Phϕ),
|≡ (set-pla  ϕ)Pl aA (Phϕ), and
|≡ (set-pla ϕ1U ϕ2)Pl aA(Phϕ1)U (Phϕ2).
Proof. Let M be a CTLKP model, q ∈ QM and P ⊆ Λ.
(i) We will provide a proof for γu =  ϕu; proofs for the other temporal operators
are analogous. Let M′ = Ma,|γ|. M, q |=P (set-pla γu)Pla Aγu holds if and
only if we have
∀λ ∈ Λ(q)∀i ∈ N0
(
M, λ[i] |= ϕu ⇒M
′, λ[i] |= ϕ
)
.
The set of paths, with which the satisfaction relation is indexed, is only relevant if
ϕ contains the universal quantifier A. Note also that ΥM′a ⊆ Λ. In consequence,
if M, q |=ΥM′ ϕ, then also M, q |=Λ ϕ. Furthermore, the sets of plausible paths
ΥMa ,Υ
M′
a inside modelsM,M′ are irrelevant becauseϕ contains neitherBa nor
Pl a.
(ii) We prove that M, q |=P (set-pla  ϕ)Pl aA (Phϕ); proofs for the other
temporal operators are analogous. We have to show the following:
∀λ ∈ Λ(q)∀i ∈ N0
(
M, λ[i] |= ϕ⇒M|γ|, λ[i] |= ϕ
)
.
This statement is true because ϕ is just a CTL path formula; i.e., the set of plausi-
ble path in the model is irrelevant.

6 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper a notion of plausible behavior is considered, with the underlying idea that
implausible options should be usually ignored in practical reasoning about possible fu-
ture courses of action. In contrast to previous approaches [5, 12], we see plausibility
as a temporal property. We add the new notion to the logic of CTLK [11], and obtain
a language which enables reasoning about what can (or must) plausibly happen. As a
technical device to define the semantics of the resulting logic, we use a non-standard
satisfaction relation |=P that allows to propagate the “current” set of plausible paths
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into subformulae. Furthermore, we propose a non-standard notion of beliefs, defined
in terms of indistinguishability and plausibility. We also propose how plausibility as-
sumptions can be specified in the object language via a plausibility update operator (in
a way similar to [8]).
Next, we use this new framework to investigate some important properties of plau-
sibility, knowledge, beliefs, and updates. In particular, we show that knowledge is an
S5 modality, and that beliefs satisfy axiomsK45 in general, andKD45 for the class of
plausibly serial models. Moreover, we prove that, for plausibly serial models, believ-
ing that ϕ is knowing that ϕ plausibly holds, and knowing ϕ is believing that it holds
physically. That is, for these models, the relationship between knowledge and beliefs is
very natural and reflects the initial intuition precisely.
In our opinion, this paper opens up several interesting directions for further work:
1. In our discourse on knowledge and plausibility, we only considered individual
knowledge of agents. It can be interesting to consider collective knowledge
as well (e.g., mutual, common and distributed knowledge). Plausibility can be
treated in a similar way; i.e., we can think of “mutual”, “common”, and “dis-
tributed plausibility” too. Consequently, these concepts may be used to define
collective beliefs in terms of collective knowledge and collective plausibility.
2. Instead of specifying sets of plausible paths by “vanilla” path formulae, one may
think of a more general (yet still finite) representation. Note that there is no
general solution to this problem, as CTL models usually include uncountably
many paths.
3. Until now, we considered neither satisfiability checking nor model checking for
our logic. This is another interesting topic for further research.
4. Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL can be used (instead of CTL) as the basis
for further studies on plausibility and beliefs. Some preliminary work on this
topic has been already reported in [1]. In particular, we would like to describe
and investigate various notions of rationality using this new framework.
5. Axiomatization of plausibility might also be studied in the future.
Finally, we would like to stress that we do not see this contribution as a mere tech-
nical exercise in formal logic. In our opinion, human agents use a similar concept
of plausibility and “practical” beliefs in their everyday reasoning in order to reduce
the search space and make the reasoning feasible. As a consequence, we suggest that
the framework we propose may prove suitable for modeling, design, and analysis of
resource-bounded agents in general.
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